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Abstract. When actors deem technological change undesirable, they may act symbolically
by pretending to comply while avoiding real change. In our study of the introduction of an
algorithmic technology in a sales organization, we found that such symbolic conformity led
unintendedly to the full implementation of the suggested technological change. To explain
this surprising outcome, we advance a regime-of-knowing lens that helps to analyze deep
challenges happening under the surface during the process of technology introduction. A
regime of knowing guides what is worth knowing, what actions matter to acquire this
knowledge, and who has the authority to make decisions around those issues. We found
that both the technologists who introduced the algorithmic technology, and the incumbent
workers whose work was affected by the change, used symbolic actions to either defend
the established regime of knowing or to advocate a radical change. Although the in-
cumbent workers enacted symbolic conformity by pretending to comply with suggested
changes, the technologists performed symbolic advocacy by presenting a positive side of
the technological change. Ironically, because the symbolic conformity enabled and was
reinforced by symbolic advocacy, reinforcing cycles of symbolic actions yielded a radical
change in the sales’ regime of knowing: from one focused on a deep understanding of
customers via personal contact and strong relationships, to one based on model predictions
from the processing of large datasets.Wediscuss the theoretical implications of thesefindings
for the introduction of technology at work and for knowing in the workplace.
Funding: S. Pachidi acknowledges the support of the Judge Business School internal grants scheme,
and S. Faraj acknowledges the support of the Canada Research Chairs program.
Keywords: knowledge • knowing • symbolic action • algorithmic technologies • artificial intelligence • analytics •
technology introduction • digital transformation • work
Introduction
The process of introducing a new technology in the
workplace creates new possibilities for ways of working
and organizing. Yet, the introduction of a new technol-
ogy becomes problematic if it threatens workers’ prac-
tices, for instance, by substituting existing ways of
knowing with novel ones or replacing and devaluing
the skills of incumbent workers (Noble 1984, Zuboff
1988, Barrett et al. 2012, Bailey and Leonardi 2015). In
such cases, workers are likely to question the supe-
riority of theways ofworking associatedwith the new
technology and resist its implementation (Markus
1983, Bailey and Barley 2011, Anthony 2018). In-
stead of outright resistance, sometimes workers use
covert ways of resisting the implementation and adopt
the new technology symbolically, by pretending or
suggesting that they use it without actually doing so
(Hewlin 2003, Berente and Yoo 2012).
Although the literature treats symbolic conformity
as a tactic that workers may use to avoid real change
(Oliver 1991,Hallett 2010),we observed that symbolic
conformity can lead, unintendedly, to the full imple-
mentation of the suggested technological change. In
our study of the introduction of an algorithmic tech-
nology in the sales department of a telecommunica-
tions organization, account managers avoided using
the introduced technology because it was associated
with ways of knowing that were orthogonal to how
they constructed and used knowledge. They resorted to
symbolic conformity by pretending to use the technol-
ogy for identifying sales opportunities. However, their
symbolic conformity significantly contributed to mak-
ing the technology appear effective in the eyes of man-
agement. This led to a full implementation of the
technology, which eventually led to rendering the
account managers redundant. Thus, whereas symbolic
18
conformity is generally viewed as a safety valve to
maintain actors’ idiosyncratic ways of working, in our
study, we saw that symbolic conformity had detri-
mental consequences for the very actors who per-
formed it.
To explain this empirical surprise, we suggest that
symbolic actions may, inadvertently, result in a radical
change of the regime of knowing in the workplace. A
regime of knowing comprises the specific knowing
practices through which actors develop and use
knowledge; the valuation schemes through which
actions, people, and things are evaluated; and the
authority arrangements that determine which actors
have control over how thework is performed in certain
tasks. We suggest that a regime-of-knowing lens is
useful to understand the contestation that unfolds
during technological change. New technologies are
often associated with ways of knowing that challenge
how the incumbent workers construct and use knowl-
edge (Galison 1997, Knorr-Cetina 1999). Knowing
practices are deeply entwined with the value that
is attached to knowledge and the means of produc-
tion thereof (Dussauge et al. 2015). Thus, changing
existing knowing practices often incites a dispute
over which values matter the most in a work domain
(Thévenot 2001, Howard-Grenville and Carlile 2006,
Nicolini 2012). Often, struggles over the appropri-
ateness of knowing practices also involve hidden
battles over who controls the way in which work
is done and who has the authority to push such
changes through (Galison 1997, Knorr-Cetina 1999,
Hilgartner 2017).
Our longitudinalqualitative studyofhowdataanalytics
technology got implemented in the business-to-
business sales function of a telecommunications orga-
nization documented changes in the regime of knowing
that were triggered by symbolic action. The regime of
knowing originally guided focus on in-depth knowl-
edge of customers via personal contacts and strong
personal relationships. The transformed regime of know-
ing emphasized identifying customer needs based on
data-analytic predictions, derived from the processing
of large, historical data sets, and involved data sci-
entists who were unfamiliar with the process of sales.
The struggle between the sales account managers and
the data scientists brought incommensurate views
to the surface concerning the appropriateness of dif-
ferent knowing practices. This struggle often took
place behind the scenes through symbolic actions. The
incumbent salesworkers enacted symbolic conformity
by pretending to comply with the suggested changes.
Similarly, the data scientists enacted symbolic advo-
cacy by hiding the account managers’ limited use of
the data-enabled ways and proclaiming the new ap-
proach as a great success. Those symbolic actions un-
intentionally reinforced each other, thereby ironically
accelerating the pace of change in the sales’ regime
of knowing.
This study contributes to the literature on tech-
nology and organizing by advancing a regime-of-
knowing lens for studying technology introduction
in theworkplace. This perspective helps see below the
surface of struggles over changing established prac-
tices. The regime-of-knowing lens shifts attention to
the deeper challenges that actors are faced with, such
as disputing what is worth knowing, what actions
matter to acquire this knowledge, and who has the
authority to make decisions around those issues. By
approaching knowing practices as entwined with
valuation schemes and authority arrangements, the
regime-of-knowing lens helps understand why sym-
bolic actions meant to defend and maintain knowing
practices may have unintended consequences for the
actors who perform them and thus can reinforce rather
than avoid change.
Theoretical Background
The process of introducing a new technology in the
workplace often results in changes in the nature of
work and organizing (Zammuto et al. 2007, Leonardi
and Barley 2010). Such transformation can be asso-
ciated with struggles concerning who gains control
over organizational processes and how work is per-
formed (Noble 1984, Zuboff 1988). For example, digital
technologies offer the possibility of transforming activ-
ities and redefining existing roles, work boundaries, and
authority in ways that go to the core of a work practice
(Barley 1986, Bailey et al. 2012, Barrett et al. 2012).
Existing skills and expertise that are often tightly
entwined with a work practice can be rendered ob-
solete by the resultant work changes (Ehn 1988,
Christin 2017). Thus, it is not surprising that tech-
nologies that afford radical work changes are often
misalignedwith actors’ existing expertise andways of
working and are likely to be treated with skepticism
(Bailey and Barley 2011, Anthony 2018) or even
resisted (Alvesson 2004, Lapointe and Rivard 2007).
Given that knowing is at the heart of work prac-
tices, the introduction of a new technology in a work
domain has consequences on how actors construct
and use knowledge (Knorr-Cetina 1999, Carlile 2002,
Orlikowski 2002). Sometimes, technologies may au-
tomate tedious and repetitive tasks that actors of-
ten consider to be the unskilled part of their work.
In such cases, the changes that technologies bring
about in work practices are welcomed by most users
(Zammuto et al. 2007, Newell et al. 2009, Leonardi
2013). In other situations, however, technology is
associatedwith radical reconfiguration of the existing
knowing practices through which actors come to
know what they need to know to perform their
work (Kraemer et al. 1987, Bailey andLeonardi 2015).
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For example, the introduction of computerized in-
formation systems in paper mills has led to radical
changes in operators’ knowing of the production
process, moving from direct sensory immersion with
materials and machines to relying on information
displayed by digital technologies (Zuboff 1988, Vallas
and Beck 1996). The introduction of technology may
even lead to a complete substitution of existing knowing
practices with new ones, by automating work tasks and
deskilling work originally performed by a group of ex-
perts (Noble 1984, Zuboff 1988, Bailey and Leonardi
2015). When the technology is associated with drastic
reconfiguration or even complete substitution of the
existing knowing practices, actors may engage in
fierce struggles.
To explain how such struggles unfold and lead to
radical changes in knowing practices, in the next
section, we advance the regime-of-knowing lens.
Regimes of Knowing
The term regime is often used in various contexts in
the social sciences to refer to an arrangement that
provides a framework for guiding action and imposes
“order on a domain or activity, typically through
some combination of formal rules, informal norms,
materialmeans, and discursive framings” (Hilgartner
2017, p. 8). In political science, the notion of regime is
used to abstract essential social, institutional, and
legal arrangements. Similarly, regime has been adopted
to describe the corpus of knowledge, techniques, and
scientific discourses that historically constitute what
society recognizes as truth (Foucault 1975). In science
and technology studies, the concept of regime has
been deployed to refer to the arrangement of norms,
rules, andprocedures that guidepolicymaking (Jasanoff
2004) or the inherent assumptions, organizing prin-
ciples, and patent ways to interpret data that con-
stitute scientific work (Galison 1997). Regimes are
consequential, by subtly shaping what, in retrospect,
appear to be the natural ways to approach scientific
inquiry. For example, the emergence of a regime of
regulatory objectivity, predicated on the absence of
an expert’s interpretation, has increasingly led to sys-
tematic reliance on quantitative approaches (Cambrosio
et al. 2006, Daston and Galison 2007). The notion of
regime brings into focus the constructed and contested
nature of ways of knowing, what counts as valuable
knowledge, who has a say in how work is organized,
and how power issues permeate this construction.
In organizations where a work environment is
reasonably stable, an accepted and seemingly natural
way of working and organizing emerges (Nicolini
2012). Actors tend to unreflectively embrace and
inhabit a regime of knowing. A regime of knowing
offers socially sanctioned conventions about what
counts as valuable knowledge, aboutwhat actions are
appropriate, and about authority arrangements. Thus,
a regime of knowing guides what constitutes skillful
performance,what tools tomaster, and how to approach
problem solving in the workplace. Applying a regime
lens toknowledgework isuseful inorder to represent the
“’relevant realities’ in which practices are embedded
and the social devices that govern our ways of en-
gaging with and articulating the world around us”
(Howard-Grenville and Carlile 2006, p. 474). We ar-
gue that a regime-of-knowing lens is also useful to
understand how work practices evolve when new
modes of knowing enter the workplace. Three as-
pects of a regime of knowing can be distinguished:
(1) the knowing practices that shape how actors de-
velop and use knowledge in a specific work domain;
(2) the valuation scheme that is used for evaluating
performance, actions, people, objects, and ideas; and
(3) authority arrangements that offer socially-sanctioned
ways to structure collective activity, to organize work,
and to coordinate tasks to ensure a skilled performance.
As illustrated in Figure 1 and explained in the fol-
lowing paragraphs, these three aspects are strongly
interlinked with each other.
Regimes of knowing are instantiated through know-
ing practices. By knowing practices, we refer to the sit-
uatedactivities throughwhichactors come toknowwhat
they need to know to proficiently perform their work.
Knowing how to act in particular circumstances is in-
extricably related to the actions that people perform
(Schatzki 2001). For example, lawyers come to know
how to set up their client’s defense strategy not only
based on their ability to recite the law. Rather, their
knowing emerges through the practices of collecting
and assessing evidence of their client’s case, the in-
teractions with the judge and jury, and other recur-
rent activities that they perform in their everyday
work. Actors who work under the same regime of
knowing perform similar knowing practices. There-
fore, they tend to pay attention to similar objects and
types of information and share distinct methods for
Figure 1. Regime of Knowing
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generating knowledge claims (Knorr-Cetina 1999,
Carlile 2002, Bechky 2003). Knowing practices are
constituted by the technology and tools used by the
actors in their work, which fundamentally shape how
actors conceive the world and produce knowledge
(Orlikowski 2006).
Knowing practices are intertwined with specific
valuation schemes that orient actors to what is worth
knowing and what is proper action to produce valuable
knowledge. Thus, valuation schemes determine what
kind of information matters and what methods are im-
portant to acquirevalue from this information (Thévenot
2001, Dussauge et al. 2015). Actors who engage in the
same practice share an evaluative orientation toward
what is considered a good way of acting or knowing
what is right or wrong (MacIntyre 1981, Nicolini
2012). Actors draw on these collective preferences
and orientations to justify their beliefs and actions, as
well as to convince others about what is a legitimate
course of action in a particular situation (Patriotta,
Gond and Schultz 2011, Cloutier and Langley 2013).
Valuation schemes not only affect knowing practices,
but they can also be shaped by them. For example, the
emergence of TripAdvisor technology for sharing
information about hotels has led to a shift in the
valuation of hotels, from expert ratings by profes-
sional reviewers to evaluations based on the online
reviews offered by guests (Orlikowski and Scott 2014).
Valuation schemes also help determine whose knowl-
edge matters most and thus which roles are rendered
important in the workplace.
Both knowing practices and valuation schemes are
also deeply entwined with the existing authority
arrangements, as powerful actors or those in au-
thority can decide what is worth knowing, and what
this knowledge is worth. Therefore, regimes of knowing
are also constituted through authority arrangements.
Authority arrangements refer to socially sanctioned
ways to organize, affording power to actors whose
expertise is highly valued, to impact how they and
others engage in the work (Bourgoin et al. 2020).
Authority arrangements are fundamentally shaped
by existing valuation schemes, because these are used
to evaluate actors and their actions, thereby deter-
mining which actors have the right skills and ex-
pertise to control task performance (Abbott 1988,
Galison 1997). By providing a shared understanding
of how power is distributed in the workplace and
which actors have the authority to determine how
work should be done, authority arrangements can also
deeply affect what is rendered as valuable knowledge,
and which knowing practices are accepted to pro-
duce it.
Technology Introduction and Struggles over a
Regime of Knowing
The process of introducing a new technology in a
work domain is often associated with changes in the
established regime of knowing (Orlikowski 2006,
Introna 2016, Monteiro and Parmiggiani 2019). When
new technologies become available, offering the promise
of a different and potentially cheaper or more efficient
way of working, actors face decisions on how to react.
Often the new technology triggers actors to rethink their
current ways of working and skill sets and can trigger
apprehension for the incumbent workers whose work
is affected by the technological change. It becomes es-
pecially challenging for the incumbent workers if the
technology is associated with ways of working that re-
quire changes in the intertwined knowing practices,
valuation schemes, and authority arrangements that
make up the current regime of knowing. For example, in
the field of strategy, one consequence of the shift toward
PowerPoint-based presentations was that presentations
became more linear, resulting in the simplification of
complex and conflicting ideas, the backgrounding of
situational data, and the subtle skewing of results to
support personal agendas (Kaplan 2011).
Not surprisingly, actors can perceive a major shift
in the regime of knowing as both an opportunity and a
threat. It may lead to struggles between those actors
who favor changes in the regime and those who have
become attached to the established knowing practices
and beliefs about knowing (Howard-Grenville and
Carlile 2006, Fayard et al. 2016). Thus, struggles over
a regime of knowing are often political, as actors
compete to maintain or establish their authority over
how work is performed and strive to impose their
own valuation scheme and knowing practices. Such
a struggle of political nature occurred, for instance,
during the 1980s, with the arrival of computational
models in the public policy arena. Modeling tran-
spired to be a nonneutral addition to bureaucratic
infighting and a way to shape and win policy debates
(Kraemer et al. 1987, King and Kraemer 1993). Dif-
ferences in what we call regimes of knowing shaped
how computer modeling tools were enrolled in policy
making. In the United States, models were rapidly
adopted, not for providing an innately superior way
of working, but because they could be weaponized in
the bureaucratic struggles within and across govern-
ment agencies. By comparison, inGermany, government
policy was traditionally reliant on long-established and
independent central bureaucratic entities that took pride
in their own internal processes and expertise in sup-
porting policies. As a result, these same computer
models only saw limited adoption.
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How incumbent workers respond to the challenge
of technology-related changes often hinges on their
professional authority and relative power within their
organization. Actors with high authority are more able
to defend their skills and expertise by rejecting the
new technology (Lapointe and Rivard 2007) or are able
to control how change in the knowing practices will take
place (Barley 1986, Bailey and Barley 2011, Anthony
2018). For example, structural engineers (Bailey et al.
2010) and fire engineers (Dodgson et al. 2007), faced
with the digitization of their work practices, agreed to
most changes, but used their authority to disallow
any automation of their engineering judgment and
continued to use their traditional hand calculations.
Actorswho lack the authority to reject the changes are
still able to avoid them by enacting evasive maneu-
vers. For example, they may perform workarounds,
in other words, use the features of the technology in
ways that deviate from the designers’ intentions
(Boudreau and Robey 2005, Azad and King 2008,
Leonardi 2011). Alternatively, actors may only loosely
couple their existing practices with the new technology-
enabled practices to deal with the inconsistencies
between their existing work practices and the newly
introduced technology, thereby allowing them to
continue with their work practices (Berente and Yoo
2012, Berente et al. 2016, Christin 2017). Finally, actors
may choose to conceal their noncompliance and en-
gage in symbolic conformity by pretending to adopt
the new practices. Symbolic conformity is not intended
tomake a systemwork. It is rather a tactic for avoiding
real use of the introduced practices and the values
and assumptions associated with them (Oliver 1991,
Zbaracki 1998, Hewlin 2003).
Often new technologies are accompanied by groups
of technologists who are trained in their workings,
believe in the promise that the technology represents a
superior way of doing, and assume the role of advo-
cates and promoters of the possibilities offered by the
technology (Barley 1986, Kraemer et al. 1987). This
may result in a wedge being driven between the in-
cumbent workers affected by the technological change
yet steeped in the existing ways of working and the
technologistswho are eager to transform thoseways. If
their proposed changes and reorganizations of work
appear risky and politically uncertain, technologists
may resort to symbolic advocacy. Symbolic advocacy
is advocacy performed via symbolic actions that aim to
attribute meaning beyond their substantive effect and
that may be “deliberately employed in order to direct
attention away from certain facts and towards others
in order to protect sectional interests, gain resources
and maintain or restructure institutional patterns
of power and deference” (Brown 1994, p. 863). Tech-
nologists may specifically foreground the positive
or performance-enhancing aspects of the associated
changes and emphasize the potential effectiveness of
the new way of working while keeping the eventual
impact on incumbent workers in the shadows (Noble
1984, Brown 1995, Fiss and Zajac 2006, Zuboff 2019).
Thus, symbolic advocacy can be an effective tactic in
order to gain legitimacy and support from manage-
ment and other stakeholders.
In sum, struggles arise when technologists intro-
duce a technology that is associated with radically
different ways of knowing, as both the technologists
and the incumbent workers whose work is affected
by the technological change have different stakes in
the stability or evolution of the regime of knowing.
In the next section, we report on our field study,
which focused on how technologists and incumbent
workers engaged in a contest, often at the symbolic
level, about which knowing practices were appro-
priate to serve corporate customers.
Research Setting
Regimes of knowing become visible at moments of
radical change, such as with the introduction of a
technology that is associated with radically differ-
ent knowing practices compared with those already
established in the workplace. Significant moments
of change may cause controversies and temporary
breakdowns of everyday practices. Controversies and
breakdowns trigger reflection by actors, who become
aware of differences, focus on the things that matter to
their own practice, and articulate their different per-
spectives in their effort to make the world compre-
hensible to themselves and to other members of the
community (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011, Nicolini
2012). At moments of controversy, power dynamics
are reshuffled and actors articulate how they know
what they know, what is considered a good way of
acting, and who has authority to say how things
should be done. During the controversy that unfolded
with the introduction of data analytics technology
in TelCo’s Sales Medium department, the regime
of knowing and how it evolved became visible to
the authors.
TelCo is a large organization (about 16,000 em-
ployees) offering telecommunication services to a
broad range of customers. Our research focus was
on the business-to-business sales department that
targeted medium-sized enterprises, known as Sales
Medium. The department employed over 100 account
managers, divided into 10 sales teams, geographi-
cally dispersed around the country. During a 24-
month field study of TelCo (March 2013–March 2015),
we observed the changes associated with the intro-
duction of data analytics technology to support sales
activities. By representing knowledge as an outcome
of algorithmic transformations of decontextualized,
digitized, and quantified information, data analytics
Pachidi et al.: Symbolic Actions and Change in a Regime of Knowing
22 Organization Science, 2021, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 18–41, © 2020 INFORMS
was associated with radically different knowing prac-
tices compared with the existing practices in the sales
function. Before the introduction of data analytics, sales
relied predominantly on human agents and their per-
sonal relations with customers.
All Sales Medium account managers were assigned
a set of 250–300 customers with whom they built a
relationship over several years. Account managers
kept in frequent contact with their customers in order
to identify sales opportunities and to generate leads
for offering telecom and information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) services. A lead indicated
that a customer had expressed interest in a product
and wanted to receive an offer for a specific portfolio.
Account managers described their work as “farming”:
through the careful tending of personal relationships
and keeping track of corporate developments (e.g.,
the opening of new offices), they were able to identify
new sales opportunities in a timely manner. They
enjoyed multifaceted interactions with their contacts,
through frequent lunches, taking them to sporting
events, and even keeping track of their family and
personal lives. The typical account manager held a
vocational (non-university) degree focused on busi-
ness or sales.
The separate Customer Intelligence department
employed a group of data scientists, whose job it was
to focus on data analytics techniques. They acted as
the champions of data analytics and extolled its po-
tential to revolutionize the operations of both mar-
keting and sales. Although they had no formal
authority over the sales department, they developed a
data analytics sales tool, labeled the customer life-
cycle management (CLM) model. Based on predic-
tive modeling and optimization algorithms, the CLM
model extracted actionable insights from historical
and population-wide data about TelCo’s customers
and their transactions.
The CLM model was associated with knowing
practices to identify sales opportunities that were
radically different from existing practices. The model
combined a number of internal and external data
sources, such as time series of customer transactions,
Nielsen market data, Gartner ICT spending predic-
tions, financial data, and usage data. The output of the
model was represented in a spreadsheet format that
contained a list of all medium-sized customers and
predictions regarding potential sales opportunities.
The CLM model allocated customers to different
customer segments (A, B, C, D) based on their his-
torical and predicted sales with TelCo. For each TelCo
product line (e.g., business telephone systems, mo-
bile phone packages, fixed line setups), the CLM
model assigned a position in the customer sales life-
cycle (inform, specify, sell, maintain), each of which
entailed a different contact strategy. Thus, the model
output consisted of a ranking of opportunities, with a
prioritized action list for account managers.
All data scientists held higher education degrees (most
often atmasters’ level) in engineering or econometrics.
Their training also included additional specialized
courses in data analytics, certified by a well-established
institute of market intelligence and analytics. Many of
them had been seconded to other companies that were
leaders in applying data analytics to their operations.
The data scientists viewed themselves as internal con-
sultants, offering the benefit of their advanced training
and techniques to improve the operations of “internal
customers”, such as marketers, campaign managers,
and product managers.
In January 2012, the data scientists proposed the
CLM model as a way to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Sales Medium sales process. At
first, the data scientists tried to collaborate with the
account managers, who were avoiding using the CLM
model because of their reservations about the way it
generated its recommendations. The account man-
agers quickly resorted to feigning use and kept to
their old ways of working. However, in February
2014, company management was swayed by the
developers of the CLM model and decided to reor-
ganize sales into amore efficientway ofworking. As a
result, the account managers were unceremoniously
dismissed, and the sales function became the responsi-
bility of the data scientists. These events marked a
drastic reconfiguration of the regime of knowing in
Sales Medium, as outlined in Table 1. Before the in-
troduction of the CLM model, the Sales Medium re-
gime of knowing highly valued the maintenance of
personal and trustworthy relationships with customers,
and was focused on knowing customers via personal
contacts, using account managers’ gut feelings to
identify sales opportunities. Because of their unique
position in managing customer relations, the account
managers had the authority to control the sales process.
However, by the end of 2014, the regime of knowing in
Sales Medium was radically different. Acting rationally
and efficiently was valued as being more important
than fostering customer relationships. Sales opportuni-
ties were identified based on predictions calculated by
processing large population-wide and historical data
sets. Because they were responsible for developing an-
alytical insights, the data scientists gained authority over
this task, taking control over which customers should be
called, when, and about which portfolio offers.
Data and Methods
The sources of evidence we used included ethno-
graphic observations, interviews, and documenta-
tion. The first author spent 24 months (starting from
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March 2013) at TelCo as a passive participant, observing
the work and interactions of both accountmanagers and
data scientists (Spradley 1980). By shadowing different
account managers for a whole working day at a time,
she observed how they worked, planned their ev-
erydaywork, contacted their customers, and used the
CLMmodel. She kept detailed notes about the actions
of the account managers, including how they used
various information systems in their work. Addi-
tionally, she engaged in informal discussions with
them during their lunch breaks. The account man-
agers were always very talkative and would often
turn to the researcher and explain to her what they
had been doing on their computers or what they had
been discussing with a contact on the phone. Simi-
larly, the first author also shadowed the data scien-
tists, specifically those involved in the construction of
the CLMmodel. She observed, for instance, how they
worked while preparing queries and algorithms for
the CLM model and attended their meetings with
other stakeholders todiscuss thedevelopmentofmodels.
The shadowing experience with the data scientists was
different from the shadowing of account managers.
The data scientists remained focused on developing
their code and would talk only if the researcher asked
them specific questions. While explaining the algo-
rithms theywere developing, the data scientistswould
also explain their views on the CLM model; the
knowing practices that they viewed as important for
the sales function; the valuation scheme that mat-
tered to them; and the authority arrangements that
they considered ideal in Sales Medium. Field notes
were complemented with photographs of the partic-
ipants in action and of their workspaces. Shadowing
was often followed by an interview to gain more in-
sight into informants’ subjective perspectives.
Another type of observation involved meetings,
which shed light on the microdynamics of interac-
tions (Feldman and Orlikowski 2011) between or-
ganizational members. In particular, the first author,
together with one of the other researchers, observed
two types of meetings: First, kickoff presentations
Table 1. The Regime of Knowing in Sales Medium
Regime of knowing in Sales Medium before the introduction of
the CLM model (2012)
Focus on relationship-based knowing
Regime of knowing in Sales Medium after the reorganization (2015)
Focus on algorithmic knowing
Knowing practice: Generating highly contextualized knowledge
based on personal contact with the customer, using intuition and
experience
Knowing practice: Generating knowledge through algorithmic
processing of large datasets consisting of factual data that is
stored in accessible databases
Representative quote: “Most times people say that account managers
are people who talk a lot, but it’s the opposite. Good account
managers are people who listen very carefully, ask the good
questions the right way, feel when a customer needs something,
and back off when he doesn’t want to. . . It’s just listening carefully
to what the customer is saying. . .”
Representative quote: “Yeah, but you can also do it for acquisition.
You can order all these potentials—so you have a potential for
acquisition, potential for churn, and potential for cross sell, and
the highest potential is on top. And when you see that this
customer has, for instance, a high probability for cross selling,
and the potential is large, then perhaps you can put this certain
phase on sell. . .”
Valuation scheme: Having a personal and trustworthy relationship
with the customer is important to perform well in sales
Valuation scheme: You need to act rationally and as efficiently as
possible. Acting based on the algorithmic outcome is more
rational and efficient
Representative quote: “I’m a ‘farmer’. . . I want to know my client,
and after a while, I’ma strong believer that when you know a client
and they know you, and they know they can trust you, you get a lot
more business from it. So, for me it’s very important to know my
customers, and that they knowwho I am, and that they can findme,
and that they know I am the one who solves everything for them.”
Representative quote: “Sometimes I just say, ‘OK, you shouldn’t
target those people, because chances are low that they will respond.
They don’t want that product, we see that based on the models.’
They are like ‘Yeah. . . but our target is that we just have to get as
many new customers as we want and I now have some budget,
so I’m just going to do this campaign anyway.’ OK, but it’s not
as efficient as they could have been. Basically, I’m just saying this
to them and hope they act in the way I would like.”
Authority arrangement: The sales process should be controlled by
the account manager because s/he is in contact with the customer.
This includes interfering with closing of the deal.
Authority arrangement: The task of identifying sales opportunities
should be separated from the act of calling the client. The role
of the data scientist is important because s/he develops
analytical insights for organizing the sales work. The role of the
account manager is reduced to that of a caller.
Representative quote: “Because it’s my customer, and I have my own
customers, it’s my own set, and it’s my responsibility, it’s my work
tomake it a commercially attractive company for TelCo. So, then I’d
rather hear it for myself, and try to adjust that feeling from the
customer, by maybe helping himwith some things, and by making
myself a trustworthy advisor.”
Representative quote: “I’m not only a provider of data and
insights. I want to be actively involved in sales. OK, they need
information, but how can I help them to also get towards an
answer to the questions they have? Because just providing the
information is still not an answer. You have to process it and you
have to change the way in which they come up with an action.”
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that were held on a quarterly basis and constituted
the main occasions for the two groups to meet face-
to-face. In these presentations, the data scientists
put forward new versions of the CLM model, and a
marketing manager unveiled new campaigns that
were running in that quarter. Furthermore, the first
author also observed some of the weekly customer
intelligence team meetings, in which the data sci-
entists would discuss updates on their analytics
projects and their plans for future projects. She
regularly forwarded her field notes to the other au-
thors for discussion and collective sense making.
Semistructured interviews with data scientists, ac-
count managers, sales team managers, and other roles
constituted another important source of evidence (Weiss
1995). The interviews were conducted by the first
author. Following each interview, she wrote up a
research diary entry and shared her memos with the
rest of the team, to discuss insights, look for emerging
themes, and consider what to prioritize in subsequent
interviews. The interviews focused on individuals’
work practices and their views of the CLM model.
During these sessions, interviewees described how
they dealt with the challenges they faced and explained
the rationale behind their actions. They also elaborated
on their views about how work should be performed,
what kind of knowledge mattered, and why the CLM
modelwas orwas not useful.We often asked participants
to bring their laptops to the interviews, or requested to
spend some time with them at their desks, so that they
could show us in detail how they made plans and how
they prepared for contact with customers. Because we
entered the field about one year after the CLM model
had been first presented to Sales Medium, parts of the
interviews referred to what had happened in the pre-
vious year. Different interview guides were prepared
for each type of informant (account manager, data
scientist, director, etc.). Over time, those interview
guideswere adjusted following specific events (e.g., the
announcement of layoffs) and became more focused
(e.g., specific questions asking why actors performed a
specific action once that action was identified). Each
interview guide was also slightly adjusted if it was
conducted after having shadowed the informant at
work. The interviews took place throughout the du-
ration of the study, until all the accountmanagers were
laid off. We also undertook a few complementary in-
terviews one year after the fieldwork to follow up how
things had evolved in TelCo since then. All interviews
were recorded, transcribed, and shared between the
authors to ensure common understanding of the data.
Finally, a variety of documents were used in order
to triangulate information from the interviews and,
in particular, to verify any retrospective information.
We used public documents (such as press releases
and TelCo annual reports), news items, PowerPoint
presentations (mainly from the kickoffs), and Excel
sheets that included the variables (and descriptions of
Table 2. Overview of Collected Data
Type of data Type of informants Number
Total
time (hours)
Interviews Account managers from Sales Medium 30 interviews 28.4
Data scientists 17 interviews 15
Fired account managers from Sales Medium 3 interviews 2.2
Account managers from other sales channels 17 interviews 16.8
Sales team managers from Sales Medium 5 interviews 5.2
Campaign manager 2 interviews 2
Marketers 2 interviews 2.3
Sales directors 2 interviews 1.1
Observations (shadowing) Account managers from Sales Medium 3 days of observations (shadowing) 24.5
Data scientists 8 days of observations (shadowing) 51
Observations of meetings Kick-off presentations from data scientists and
campaign manager to account managers
and sales team managers
3 meetings observed 3.2
Weekly meetings of the data scientists’ team 7 meetings observed 6.5
Unofficial meetings Data scientists 15 meetings with data scientists and the
Manager of Customer Intelligence
15
Personal notes (diary of
researcher)
Based on interactions with all respondents — —
Documents Internal documents 43 documents —
Documents Public documents 23 documents —
Documents News 9 documents —
Notes. The total number of interviews was 78, with a total recorded time of 73 hours. The total number of observations was 21, with a total
observation time of 85.2 hours. The total number of documents was 75.
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those variables) included in the CLM model. An over-
view of all collected data is provided in Table 2.
Data Analysis
Because of the processual nature of our research
question, we followed a process research approach
(Langley 1999) to track the flow of events and to
understand why things unfolded in a particular way.
The complexity of the data and the variability of their
temporal embeddedness led us to use a multitude
of strategies.
First, we constructed a case narrative. The case
narrative is a useful strategy to enrich understanding
of a phenomenon, as it includes contextual details that
capture the richness and complexity of the setting
(Langley 1999). We created an event list (Poole et al.
2000) to maintain our chain of evidence and identify
patterns, and we used this as a scaffold while alter-
nating between the different sensemaking strategies
and literature. Using the event list, we constructed a
detailed story from the raw data that helped us
construct the chronology of events, identify linkages
and patterns between different types of events, and
find emerging themes (Pettigrew 1990). Using quotes
from the interview transcripts, the case narrative
voiced the perspectives of the data scientists, account
managers, sales team managers, the campaign man-
ager, and higher management. The narrative was
further enriched with observations captured in the
field notes and evidence from the additional docu-
ments. Fictional names were used to enhance the
readability of the story without compromising the
anonymity of informants. As we identified important
events that signaled change (e.g., decisions from higher
management), we used temporal bracketing to structure
the narrative into three periods.
Second, we used the strategy of thematic coding.
During the fieldwork, we had already performed
inductive coding in order to track the different work
practices of the data scientists and the account man-
agers; their different views over sales work; their in-
teraction with the algorithmic technology (CLMmodel);
and the actions that they performed to deal with their
struggle. The construction of the narrative helped us
shift to thematic coding,which includedseveral iterations
after reading the literatureon technology implementation
and knowing in practice. The theme of regime of know-
ing emerged as important, since the struggle between
the account managers and data scientists concentrated
on three interrelated aspects: the knowing practices that
were performed to find sales opportunities; the valuation
scheme that guided what good sales work entailed; and
the authority arrangements that determined which ac-
tors controlled how the sales work was done. As the
participants articulated their views on knowing prac-
tices, valuation schemes, and authority arrangements
while in conversation with each other or with the au-
thors, wewere able to trackwhat the regime of knowing
in Sales Medium was like before the introduction of
the CLM model and how it came to be eventually, after
it was restabilized with the reorganization of Sales Me-
dium. We provide this comparison in Table 1.
Third, we performed further thematic coding while
tracking the actions that different actors performed as
they engaged over the three aspects of the regime of
knowing in Sales Medium. We found that many of
these actions were performed symbolically. Those
symbolic actions were further refined into symbolic
conformity, performed by the account managers to
appear as if they were conforming to the changes
while trying to defend their knowing practices; and
symbolic advocacy, performed by the data scientists
to gain authority and establish the knowing practices
and valuation scheme associated with the CLM model,
by obscuring the unfolding changes associated with the
technology and only presenting their positive side.
Fourth, we performed process analysis. We returned
to the case narrative and the event list to develop a
process explanation. We compared the various actions
performed by each group of actors and traced how these
had consequences for other actions. We coded each ac-
tion for whether it concerned a type of symbolic action,
the nature of the symbolic action if applicable (symbolic
conformity or symbolic advocacy) and which part of the
regime it engaged with (e.g., whether the action was
meant to defend the knowing practices). We traced the
consequences of the symbolic actions to theorize about
their impact on the change process. We also found it
important to trace the consequences of actions that were
not symbolic but which had been triggered by former
symbolic actions. The impact of those actions alone was
not sufficient to change the regime of knowing, but those
actions enabled later symbolic actions to occur and thus,
indirectly, had an effect on the regime change. Finally,
we analyzed how each action or set of actions impacted
the regime of knowing. This comparison is summarized
in Tables 3, 4, and 5. This process analysis helped us
theorize about why people interact via symbolic ac-
tions and how such symbolic actions enable change
in the regime of knowing.
The Implementation of Analytics in Telco
Sales Medium
In this section, we analyze how the struggle over
incommensurate ways of knowing unfolded after the
introduction of the CLM model in Sales Medium and
how it led to a radical change in the regime of knowing.
During the struggle, both the account managers and
the data scientists performed various symbolic ac-
tions in their efforts to affect the knowing prac-
tices, valuation schemes, and authority arrangements.
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As we will show in the sections that follow, those
symbolic actions had consequences for the evolution of
the regime of knowing. Based on the findings that we
report, we developed a process model of change of a
regime of knowing through symbolic actions (Figure 2).
Although the main concepts and process model
have been inductively developed, we present them in
advance to help readers understand the theoretical
significance of dynamics in the case history (Berends
and Deken 2020). As we explain later, our model cap-
tures the changes of the regime of knowing in each of
the three time periods of our narrative.
Our model depicts incumbent workers (in our case
the account managers) and technologists (in our case
the data scientists) enacting distinct sets of sym-
bolic actions: The account managers enacted symbolic
Table 3. Actions Performed During the Period of Attempted Collaboration and Their Impact on the Regime of Knowing
Action
label Action and symbolic nature Aim of action Action trigger Consequence
Impact on the regime
of knowing
DS1 Data scientists team up with
the campaignmanager and
participate in regular
meetings that he organizes






The data scientists gain






This triggers symbolic action
AM 1, because account
managers are expected to
participate in those
meetings.




DS1 Data scientists gain presence
in Sales Medium.
Symbolic conformity:
Finding no use in the
presentations, but aiming
to appear collaborative.
This enables symbolic action
DS2.
DS2 Data scientists frame the
model as a supportive tool,





AM1 The CLM model becomes
known as an alternative
way of finding sales
opportunities.
Impact on valuation scheme:
Two competing sets of
assumptions for how sales
work should be done.
Symbolic advocacy: Aiming
to change the current way




managers to reflect on the
usefulness of the CLM
model and provide an
explanation (AM2) rather
than simply ignore.






DS2 This triggers the data
scientists to explain how
the CLM model works
(DS3) to motivate the
account managers to use it.
It also informs the data
scientists’ action to track
the use of the CLM model
to prove its effectiveness
(DS4).
DS3 Data scientists discuss the
model’s inner workings
and ask for feedback.
Get new knowing
practices used
AM2 This initiates a conversation
with the account
managers, who reflect on
the CLM model and
provide feedback (AM3).
Impact on knowing practices:
Acting upon the analytics
becomes a known practice.AM3 Account managers provide
feedback to data scientists.
Defend knowing
practices
DS3 This informs the data
scientists about ways to
adapt the CLM model so
that the account managers
find it useful (DS7).
Notes. Action labels startingwith DS indicate actions performed by the data scientists. Action labels startingwith AM indicate actions performed
by the account managers.
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conformity by merely appearing to conform to the
suggested changes, in their effort to defend their existing
knowing practices. The data scientists enacted sym-
bolic advocacy by obscuring the unfolding changes
associated with the technology and only presenting
their positive side, in their efforts to gain authority
and change the accepted knowing practices and val-
uation scheme. As we will show, the account man-
agers’ actions of symbolic conformity enabled the data
scientists to enact symbolic advocacy that, in turn,
reinforced further symbolic conformity by the incum-
bent workers. This mutual reinforcement between
symbolic conformity and symbolic advocacy became
a mechanism for the transformation of the regime
of knowing, because the three aspects of a regime of
knowing (knowing practices, valuation scheme, au-
thority arrangements) were intertwined such that
change in one aspect of the regime eventually led to
changes in the other two. This is depicted by the bi-
directional arrows connecting the three aspects of a
regime of knowing in Figure 2.
We structure the remainder of this section into three
sections, representing the three periods of the nar-
rative. In presenting the findings, we explain how the
interactions modeled in our process model in Figure 2
are instantiated in each of the three periods, leading to
gradual changes of the regime of knowing in the Sales
Medium function at TelCo.
Period of Attempted Collaboration
In the first period, the CLM team made various at-
tempts to bridge the differences between themand the
sales team and collaborate with the account managers
(see Table 3 for a summary of the actions and their
impact on the regime of knowing in this period). In
early 2012, the data scientists introduced the CLM
model and its new way of approaching sales at an
information session attended by most of the account
managers. Contrary to the data scientists’ expecta-
tions, the account managers did not appear interested
nor did they engage any further:
In the beginning, we first did a presentation for the
Sales Medium about the model for all the teams to-
gether in one session. And then we introduced the
model, and everybody was sitting there, ‘OK, OK,
maybe for others, but I don’t think I have to do it.’
(Data scientist)
To overcome the account managers’ lack of interest
and to engage with them, the data scientists reached
out to the campaign manager responsible for the
campaigns that ran in Sales Medium. The campaign
manager was liked by the sales teams and met with
them on a regular basis. He wanted to improve the
campaign management process and therefore sup-
ported the CLM model, encouraging the account
managers to use it. Thus, by teaming up with the
campaign manager, the data scientists ensured that
they could gain direct access to the sales teams via
regular meetings and had someone on the inside who
would promote the CLM model to them.
The account managers who participated in the
meetings did not find the presentations by the data
scientists useful. However, they only attended them
so that they and their sales team manager appeared
collaborative:
I’ve seen these presentations four or five times . . . So,
after two times I told my manager, ‘very nice to be
there, but it has no added value for us to be at the
presentation.’ Because the presentations are pretty
much the same: ‘We’ve changed this, we’ve changed
that, blah blah blah blah. . . .’ This is it. But it’s po-
litically good to be there. For my manager, to have his
complete team there, and for us to show our faces. So
we go. . . . (Account manager)
Thus, the account managers symbolically conformed
by attending the meetings with the data scientists, de-
spite having no interest in the talks about the CLM
model, and only attended to look collaborative and
stay informed about the latest campaigns. Neverthe-
less, this worked well for the data scientists, as they
were now able to establish regular face-to-face contact
with the account managers, thereby gaining a legiti-
mate foothold in Sales Medium. By attending the
joint meetings, the account managers could no longer
simply ignore the data scientists and their alternative
view of sales work. Although the account managers
may have engaged in the meetings primarily for sym-
bolic reasons to appear collaborative, the net effect
was that the data scientists became legitimate par-
ticipants and were enabled to put forth a different
valuation scheme and claim authority in the sales
regime of knowing.
The data scientists met with the sales teams twice
each quarter: at kickoff meetings at the start of each
quarter and at evaluation meetings one month later.
In those meetings, the data scientists tried to dem-
onstrate the value of the CLM model by emphasizing
how the tool could support account managers in in-
creasing their sales, while simultaneously trying to
avoid making it look like a threat to the existing ways
of working. This was a symbolic advocacy tactic by
the data scientists: Although they believed that the
current way of working in sales was inefficient and
aimed to change it, they carefully tried to mitigate the
defensiveness of the accountmanagers by framing the
value of the model as a supportive tool, rather than a
mandatory change in the way of working:
A year ago I went to a presentation of the model with
[the campaignmanager], and they [accountmanagers]
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were sitting there just like that [crosses her arms tightly],
‘Oh, I know my customers myself! Why do I have to
use the model? . . . And it takes a lot of time for me . . . .’
So it wasn’t a nice presentation! [chuckles] So that’s
why we’ve got the model, but also a lot of massaging
egos, just to try get themodel accepted. (Data scientist)
Such interactions forced the account managers to
engage in conversations to explain why they valued
talking to their customers and forming deep rela-
tionships with them. The two groups sparred over the
nature of knowledge and the relevance of each other’s
valuation scheme:
Kelly [data scientist] explains how the model predicts
the roaming [sales possibility]. One account manager
jumps into the conversation: ‘But remember, this is an
indication. You have to feel them [the customers]when
you are sitting with them at the table.’ Kelly replies
that her numbers are based on historical data. (From
fieldnotes during kickoff meeting)
The kickoff meetings led to significant interactions
over the different knowing practices. The data sci-
entists used thesemeetings to present the workings of
the CLM model and used the evaluation meetings to
obtain feedback from the account managers to un-
derstand how the CLM model could fit in with the
account managers’ way of working. The account
managers provided some feedback on how to im-
prove the tool and explained that they had tried using
the CLM model but did not trust its output. The ac-
count managers continued to avoid working with the
CLM model:
So, we received the CLM model once, and I opened
it and I saw three faults in it, and I thought, ‘Ah let’s
not bother,’ and closed it again. Yeah . . . useless. . . .
(Account manager)
To summarize, in this period, the data scientists
tried to collaborate with the account managers. To
maintain their way of working while appearing col-
laborative, the account managers attended the meet-
ings with the data scientists symbolically. This
symbolic conformity, however, had an impact on the
regime of knowing: The data scientists became legit-
imate participants in Sales Medium, which, conse-
quently, affected the authority arrangements. The data
scientists were then enabled to enact symbolic advo-
cacy, by symbolically framing the technology as
nonthreatening and supportive. In this way, the data
scientists pushed the use of the new technology as a
valuable way of working and thus had an impact on
the existing valuation scheme. Through these inter-
actions, the CLM model came to be acknowledged in
Sales Medium as a possible alternative way of finding
sales opportunities, even though it did not (yet) affect
the actual knowing practices.
Period of Limited Mutual Adjustment
The period of attempted collaboration was followed
by a period of limited mutual adjustment, in which
the data scientists and the accountmanagers appeared to
accommodate their differences by adjusting their prac-
tices. However, those adjustments were rather minimal
or even just pretend (see Table 4 for a summary of the
actions and their impact).
In the second quarter of 2012, the data scientists
started tracking the leads generated by the account
managers, with the help of the CLM model. To ad-
dress the account managers’ concerns, the data sci-
entists wanted to prove that the tool was an effective
way of working. Therefore, the data scientists asked
the account managers to use a specific code in their
sales support CRM system when registering leads
generatedwith the use of theCLMmodel. As very few
account managers used the CLM model, initially the
numbers of leads registered by most sales teams were
very low. However, there was one sales team that did
start registering leads with the CLM code. Their
manager, Kate, was the only sales teammanager who
supported the CLMmodel on its introduction. Driven
by her ambition to lead a successful team, Kate en-
couraged her account managers to support the CLM
model. However, often, Kate’s team members only
symbolically registered leads with the CLM code,
without actually having used the model:
She [Kate] tells us to use it [the CLM model] . . . We
always add the code [when registering the leads] . . . But
when my colleague calls me and says, ‘We have a
client,’ then I’ve found the sales opportunity from him
and not from using the CLMmodel. But, still, I have to
add the CLM code, even if the opportunity did not
come from the CLM. (Account manager)
This symbolic conformity was enacted by Kate’s
account managers to defend their actual knowing
practices, but it had unexpected material consequences.
Although the leadswith the CLM codewere registered
for symbolic reasons, the CRM database started to
accumulate data indicating that the model had been
used. Thus, the symbolic conformity action aimed at
defending the knowing practices had an impact on the
valuation scheme, because there were data suggesting
that the CLM model was a valuable way of working, at
least for some.
This symbolic conformity also helped the data
scientists, as they were able to extract these data and
use them to argue that the CLMmodel worked and to
convince the account managers to use it more often.
More specifically, the data scientists started bench-
marking the number of leads registeredwith the CLM
code per team and presented this comparative anal-
ysis at the quarterly kickoff meetings with the ac-
count managers. They presented Kate’s team as
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Table 4. Actions Performed During the Period of Limited Mutual Adjustment and Their Impact on the Regime of Knowing
Action
label Action and symbolic nature Aim of action
Action
trigger Consequence
Impact on the regime
of knowing
DS4 Data scientists ask account
managers to register leads






This triggers account managers
to register symbolically, as
their team manager wants
them to support the CLM
model, but they do not want
to change their knowing
practices (AM4).
AM4 Account managers in Kate’s
team start registering leads




DS4 Data in CRM system indicate
that the CLM model is used
by some account managers.
Symbolic conformity:
Pretending to use the CLM
model while performing own
knowing practices.
This enables the data scientists
to show that the CLM model
is being used by some (DS5,
DS6, DS8).
Impact on valuation scheme:
The CLM model appears to
work for some.




AM4 Registration numbers in the
presentation slides make
early adopters appear as
champions.
Impact on valuation scheme: The
CLM model appears to be
an effective way of working.
Symbolic advocacy: Avoiding
comparison with other sales
metrics to show CLM model
is a good way of working.




increase their influence by
achieving to put pressure
on account managers.
AM5 Account managers register




DS5 More data accumulated in the
CRM system indicating that
the CLM model is used.
Symbolic conformity:
Pretending to use the CLM
model while performing own
knowing practices to get rid
of the pressure.
This enables the data scientists
to show that their model is
successfully used (DS6, DS8).
DS6 Data scientists celebrate increase
in registration numbers as







triggers account managers to
register more (AM5).Symbolic advocacy: Avoiding
thorough analysis of
registration numbers to show
CLM model is a good way of
working.
DS7 Data scientists update the CLM




AM3 The updates trigger the account
managers to open the tool to
easily find information (AM6).
Impact on knowing practices:
Both groups engage more





updates to make account
managers use the tool.




DS7 This legitimizes the registration
of leads with the CLM code
(AM7).
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championing the CLMmodel and shared their “success
story” with the other sales teams. However, the data
scientists’ action meant to advocate the value of the
tool was also symbolic. The data scientists presented
the leads registered with the CLM code because it
supported their argument. However, as acknowl-
edged below, they avoided presenting the total sales
performance per team and only benchmarked the
registration data:
If you just have four big customers that want to get all
their mobile phone contracts with TelCo and you
didn’t use the model but you’re just lucky, like I said,
then you can have a small number of orders with very
high revenues. So we do it [comparing with other sales
metrics], but we don’t want to get it known, that’s all.
(Data scientist)
This symbolic advocacy enacted by the data sci-
entists affected authority relationships: The data
scientists gained influence in Sales Medium by put-
ting pressure on the other sales teams to use the CLM
model. These other account managers responded by
following the example of their colleagues in Kate’s
team: registering sales leads with the CLM code
without having actually used the CLM model to
generate those leads:
The data scientists want us to use the CLM and asked
us, ‘When you have a sales opportunity in CRM, just
add the CLM code.’ So everybody did it. So now it
seems as if all the sales opportunities came from CLM,
but in the real world, that’s not true. So everybody
thought, when we sign the CLM code, we get rid of
them, and then we don’t have the pressure. . . . (Ac-
count manager)
Thus, the symbolic advocacy performed by the data
scientists, made possible by the symbolic conformity
initially enacted byKate’s team, resulted in reinforcing
the acts of symbolic conformity that were now per-
formed by more account managers. This increased
symbolic conformity also created actual consequences:
More data accumulated in the CRM system, suggesting
that theCLMmodelwaswidely used. Table 6 shows the
registration numbers per sales team per quarter. The
data scientists acted on these data to strengthen
the apparent effectiveness of the CLM model. They
continued presenting the registration data to the sales
teams at the kick-off meetings and celebrated the in-
crease in the registration numbers as a success of the
CLMmodel, tomotivate the accountmanagers towork
more with it:
The campaign manager opens the next slide named
‘Registration in the CRM system.’He explains that the
account managers need to add the CLM code when
registering leads to trace model usage. Then he pres-
ents the results of the registration and says, ‘The
numbers of won orders [marked with the CLM code]
are much higher than before!’ He thanks the team.
(Fieldnotes from kickoff meeting).
However, thiswas also a symbolic advocacy action,
because the data scientists continued to avoid in-
vestigating the veracity of those registration numbers
and did not compare them with other data from
the CRM system. This was highlighted by the head
of customer intelligence, after several quarters of
benchmarking the registration numbers at the kick-
off meetings:
If there’s a lot of pressure to use this code, we should
validate if this code is used this way, meaning that
they’re not using it so they can say to their manager
that they’ve been using the model. So we want to
validate that at a later stage. I think somewhere in
the fourth quarter [i.e., 2013-Q4]. (Head of customer
intelligence)
Although account managers registered the use of
the CLM code symbolically to defend their knowing
practices, the regime of knowing was affected none-
theless. The data scientists were enabled to perform
symbolic actions while advocating for the new tech-
nology and were thus able to put more pressure on the
Table 4. (Continued)
Action
label Action and symbolic nature Aim of action
Action
trigger Consequence
Impact on the regime
of knowing
AM7 Account managers register
leads with the CLM code, as
they use the additional fields.
Defend knowing
practices
DS7 Triggering more registration of
leads with the CLM code,
even though the predictions
are not used. This also enables
the data scientists to celebrate
the success of the CLMmodel
(DS6, DS8).
Impact on valuation scheme: The
CLM model is valued as a
complete information tool.
Symbolic conformity:
Appearing to act upon the
predictions, while only using
the additional fields and
relying on direct contact with
customers.
Notes. Action labels startingwith DS indicate actions performed by the data scientists. Action labels startingwithAM indicate actions performed
by the account managers.
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account managers, which had an effect on the authority
arrangements. By making the CLM model appear to be
an effective way of doing sales, this also affected the
valuation scheme.
Next to the registration of leads, the data scientists
and account managers started adjusting their knowing
practices. These adjustments were, again, of a symbolic
nature. Acting on the feedback collected in their meet-
ings with the sales teams, the data scientists started
adding extra fields to the output of the CLM model to
meet the information needs of the account managers,
such as more information about the duration of cus-
tomers’ contracts. This action, however, was mainly
performed symbolically, because the added changes
were minimal and did not affect the algorithmic
knowing practice that the CLM model represented.
Instead of changing their algorithmic models based
on the account managers’ feedback, the data scientists
only added extra information fields to the spread-
sheet, such as contract termination dates. Adding
this information did not cost the data scientists much
time or effort. However, it did show that the data sci-
entists took the feedback from the account managers
into consideration. The data scientists assumed that this
extra informationwould trigger the accountmanagers to
use the spreadsheetwith theCLMmodeloutput, because
the account managers already used that same informa-
tion in their everyday work, but up until then they had
had to search for it in various other information systems.
As one of the data scientists noted:
Because for out-of-contract information, they [account
managers] really have to look in the customer view
mobile system, and have to apply all kind of filters. . .
And for us it’s a piece of script [scripting language] and
we can put it in. . . . (Data scientist)
The data scientists’ symbolic advocacy action of
updating the CLM model every quarter was mate-
rialized in the spreadsheets containing the model
output. As expected by the data scientists, this trig-
gered the account managers to open the spreadsheets
more often to find the additional information more
easily and use it in their work. By using the additional
fields, the account managers could legitimately say
that they were using the CLM spreadsheet and had a
legitimate reason to register more leads in the CRM
systemwith the CLM code. However, this wasmerely
an act of symbolic conformity tomaintain their knowing
practices, as the account managers mainly just used the
additional information, and continued not to use the
predictions of the CLMmodel, which were supposed to
be the main aspect that would change their way of
working. They also continued to rely on direct contact
with their customers as, for them, this was the most
effective way of finding sales opportunities. One ac-
count manager admitted his nonreliance on the CLM
model: “mostly I don’t use it. I use it for certain facts,
of course it’s nice to know when certain contracts
terminate.”Another account manager acknowledged
how little his knowing practices had changed:
Because I speak with the client, and the client knows
best what he wants and what he needs, and not just a
system that says yeah, based on numbers, this is the
potential. You have to speak to the client to really
know what’s going on. . . So we’re using CLM just as
support; that’s not what the client wants or is. It’s just a
support. The true information comes from the cus-
tomer himself. . . . (Account manager)
In sum, in this period the account managers and
data scientists performed mutual adjustments, but
thesemainly took symbolic forms. Table 4 shows how
the symbolic conformity actions by the account man-
agers triggered symbolic advocacy by the data scien-
tists, and vice versa. The account managers enacted
symbolic conformity and pretended to use the CLM
by registering their sales leads into the CRM system,
without actually using the CLM model. In addition, the
data scientists advocated the changes associated with
the CLMmodel via symbolic means. They pretended to
modify the CLMmodel to make it more useful for sales
but did sowith the trivial addition of new fields based on
pre-existingmodel data. The accountmanagers enacted
symbolic conformity by using the improved model in
the most basic way, so that they could maintain their
knowing practices. They started using a small set of
information from the model as support (e.g., contract
termination dates), without changing theirmainway of
working. Yet, all sides agreed that the CLMmodel was
being used in SalesMedium. These symbolic actions had
consequences for the regime of knowing. First, the val-
uation scheme was affected, because the CLM model
became established as an effective way of doing sales.
Second, the data scientists strengthened their au-
thority, because of their involvement in managing the
model and its data and by customizing it to the needs
of the account managers. Finally, as both groups
seemed to engage more actively with the different
knowing practices, it appeared as if there were positive
developments on that aspect. Yet, account managers
continued to rely on their traditional relationship-based
knowing practices, while minimally interacting with
the CLM model.
Period of Managerial Intervention
The period of limited mutual adjustments was followed
by a period of managerial intervention, in which higher
management intervened in the unfolding struggle over
the regime of knowing. Taking into consideration the
power of higher management at TelCo, these inter-
ventions ended up being highly influential for the
evolution of the regime of knowing in Sales Medium.
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Table 5. Actions Performed During the Period of Managerial Intervention and Their Impact on the Regime of Knowing
Action
label Action and symbolic nature Aim of action Action trigger Consequence of symbolic action
Impact on the
regime of knowing
DS8 Data scientists present
registration data to higher
management.
Gain authority AM4, AM5, AM7 Convincing management to












whether analytics is really





part of the training
for new account
managers.
MG1 Higher management supports
the CLM model and push
account managers to use it.
Affect knowing
practices
DS8 This encourages the data
scientists to try to expand the
influence of the CLM mode,
e.g. by making it an evaluation
tool (DS9), or by suggesting













It also increases the pressure for
the account managers and
triggers more symbolic
registration (AM8).
DS9 Data scientists make the CLM






MG1 This indicates that the data
scientists had sufficient
authority to impact how Sales
Mediumwas organized. It also
shows that the CLM model
was now the legitimate way of
working. It resulted in




AM8 Account managers increase the
symbolic registration of leads
with the CLM code.
Defend knowing
practices
MG1, DS9 Data in the CRM system show a
success story, making the CLM
model appear as if it is widely
used and effective. This later
informs higher management to
frame the reorganization as a
change toward making sales
more data-driven and efficient
(MG3).
Symbolic conformity:
Pretending to use the CLM
model while performing own
knowing practices, to appear
compliant and avoid the high
pressure.
DS10 Data scientists suggest changes
based on data analyses to
higher management to make




MG1 This informs higher
management’s decision to
reorganize the Sales Medium
(MG2) and to frame the
reorganization as a change












MG2 Higher management reorganizes
the Sales Medium function by





DS10 & Need to cut
down costs
This has a direct impact on the
knowing practices in Sales
Medium as it ceases the
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It is, however, important to analyze how these inter-
ventions came about and how the actions of the data
scientists and account managers led to such mana-
gerial interventions (see Table 5 for a summary of the
actions and their impact).
As can be seen in Table 6, the number of leads
registered with the CLM code by the account man-
agers in the CRM system continued to increase. In
January 2013, after a year of collecting these data, the
data scientists presented the registration data to higher
management to show that the CLM model was ef-
fective. This was an important step for them, as they
knew that once higher management started support-
ing the model, the account managers would have to
comply and work with it fully. However, the data
scientists were selective in the data they presented to
higher management. Similar to the benchmarking of
the registration numbers at the kickoff presentations,
they avoided comparing the leads registered with the
CLM code to other sales metrics. Thus, this was an act
of symbolic advocacy by the data scientists, meant to
increase their authority. As illustrated by the following
quote from the head of sales, higher management was
persuaded and began to support the data scientists to
further integrate data analytics into sales:
We need analytics far more thanweuse it rightnow. . . .All
that data and all the analytics makes the life of a sales
Table 6. Number of Leads Registered with the CLM Code in the CRM System
Sales team Q1 2012 Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4 2012 Q1 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013
Healthcare 3 0 176 46 No benchmarking among sales teams.
Only the total number of leads was
tracked and presented at the kickoff
meetings.
East 1 9 24 122 56
East 2 0 28 95 116
East 3 4 7 111 30
West 1 4 0 269 63
West 2 0 0 167 69
West 3 0 100 106 148
South 1 (Kate) 286 637 1,455 1,396
South 2 6 22 393 127
South 3 9 5 1,085 360
Total 321 823 3,979 2,411 13,180 11,418 24,306 15,955
Table 5. (Continued)
Action
label Action and symbolic nature Aim of action Action trigger Consequence of symbolic action
Impact on the
regime of knowing
account managers. It also
entails more involvement of














DS8, AM8, DS10 The CLM model is mentioned in
all presentation slides; the data
scientists gain a more central
role in Sales Medium and thus
have the legitimacy to getmore












lose all of their
control as they get
fired.
Symbolic advocacy: Actual need
to cut down costs is framed
as a positive change.
DS11 Data scientists get involved in
the reorganization of Sales
Medium and take over the





MG2, MG3 This indicates that the knowing
practices are now radically
changed, and that the data
scientists have expanded their
authority over sales tasks.
Notes. Action labels startingwith DS indicate actions performed by the data scientists. Action labels startingwithAM indicate actions performed
by the account managers. Action labels starting with MG indicate actions performed by higher management.
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person easier, so they can be more effective. And the
company will not just have to assume that the sales
person is doing their work properly. We’ll know it. So I
think there’s a great benefit to putting far more energy
on analytics than we do right now. (Head of sales)
From this point, higher management announced
that all account managers had to work with the CLM
model. This increased the pressure on the account
managers, because the sales team managers had to
commit their teams to actively use the CLM model.
The Director of Marketing and Sales said, ‘we must
make that a way of working . . . I want every sales team
to work with it, and do the right registration.’ Then I
organized all the sales team managers. We had a big
meeting, they came to it, andwe explained it. And they
gave their commitment . . . We saw the progress of
using themodel as a standardway ofworking, but also
the right registration in CRM . . . In the reviews, the
sales team manager would talk about CLM with his
account managers. (Mike, campaign manager)
Thus, symbolic advocacy by the data scientists,
performed to gain the support of higher management
by presenting them with the registration data, had a
great impact on the regime of knowing: The data
scientists gained more authority over the sales work
andwere able to putmore pressure on the sales teams.
Using their gained authority, the data scientists were
also able to have an impact on the valuation scheme in
SalesMedium: TheCLMmodel became established as
the legitimate way of working in Sales Medium. The
data scientists also started pushing for the CLM
model to become a tool for the sales teammanagers to
evaluate the performance of their account managers.
Ultimately, the data scientists’ symbolic advocacy
action, originally intended to gain authority, also
impacted the established knowing practices at Sales
Medium, because the CLMmodel was included in the
training of newly hired account managers.
These changes created a difficult environment for
the account managers, as they experienced more pres-
sure than ever to use the CLM model:
At the beginning of 2013, a big rumble in the jungle. . .
‘Why don’t you use that? Can you tell me why?’ And
not only tome, but also tomyother colleagues . . . You can
chat with your sales teammanager, but he has another
wayof thinking . . . He had tomake people quiet, and he
said, ‘I can get to my people; they have to fill that code
in and I get no more questions.’ (Account manager)
The account managers realized that registering
leads with the CLM code symbolically had worked
against them. However, because they found it diffi-
cult to embrace the use of analytics in their work, they
registered leads with the CLM code even more than
before, in order to appear compliant with the changes
and maintain their knowing practices:
For every sales opportunity we had to put the CLM
code in there . . . People did not use CLM, but put the
code in . . . Excel management from the management.
At headquarters they don’t want to hear that, in Re-
gion East, nobody uses the CLM . . . It’s political.
Somebody took a lot of time to make the CLM model.
Yeah, that’s a lot of money. [chuckles] Then you have to
show that it works. . . . (Account manager)
Thus, by gaining management support with their
symbolic advocacy action, the data scientists triggered
the account managers to resort to further symbolic
conformity. As can be seen in Table 6, over 2013, the
numbers of leads registered with the CLM code in-
creased exponentially, making the CLM model ap-
pear as if it was both widely used and effective. The
data scientists celebrated the increase in registration
numbers as a success but stopped benchmarking the
sales teams, as all teams now registered leadswith the
CLM code. They did, however, continue to present
their success to higher management, as indicated in
the following excerpt from our fieldnotes:
She also showed me a slide she has specifically about
the CLM model. She said that she and Claire used
such a slide every month to show to management
and to higher management that the model is really
working. On the top right there was a graph showing
the number of leads and value of leads that have been
registered in the funnel with the CLM code, for each
month of 2013. It was an increasing line, which she said
proved that the model had been used a lot. She told me
that they couldn’t track which of the leads were
transferred into orders. (Observation of data analyst
preparing a presentation for higher management)
Once the data scientists became more influential in
sales work, after gaining the support of higher man-
agement, they used their newly gained authority to
suggest more changes in the organizational structure
and processes of the sales department. Based on their
data analyses, the head of customer intelligence ad-
vised higher management “how customers could be
served more effectively and efficiently.”
In February 2014, higher management announced
a major reorganization in Sales Medium, which ren-
dered the account managers redundant as of the end
of 2014 and entailed outsourcing contact with cus-
tomers to external sales organizations. Although this
decision was driven by the need to reduce costs, as
TelCo was facing problems in the rapidly changing
telecoms industry, this reorganization announcement
by higher management also had a symbolic dimen-
sion: Because the CLM model was now regarded as
an effective way of working (a result of the symbolic
conformity actions by the account managers and the
symbolic advocacy actions by the data scientists),
higher management framed the reorganization of
Sales Medium as a shift by TelCo toward becoming
Pachidi et al.: Symbolic Actions and Change in a Regime of Knowing
Organization Science, 2021, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 18–41, © 2020 INFORMS 35
more data-driven and efficient. This act of symbolic
advocacy could be observed through the slides pre-
sented by higher management that gave the message
that TelCowas increasing efficiencywith the use of IT.
This action was even perceived as symbolic by the
head of customer intelligence, as he explained in the
following quote:
In February we had this meeting, and there was this
presentation by the Director of Marketing and Sales.
And most of the slides contained ‘CLM model,’ ‘CLM
way of working,’ because he saw it as ‘the way’. . . He
told us, ‘This is the way we are doing it, and this is
going to make it all more efficient and effective’. But
for them, and I’m very honest, it’s like something they
can hook these things on. If they say ‘CLM model,’
people believe it. But still, it’s just a strategic step in
reducing costs and more IT oriented. . . it’s not all
because of this CLM way of working. (Head of cus-
tomer intelligence)
The layoffs and outsourcing plans of the reorga-
nization had a significant impact on the regime of
knowing at SalesMedium. Acting efficiently based on
data analytics became established as the appropriate
way of working in sales, which changed the valuation
scheme from valuing information gained from close
interaction with customers to valuing information
based on rational calculations. This change in the
valuation scheme also enabled the data scientists to
gain more authority and acquire a more central role in
Sales Medium, because they played an active role in
the reorganization process at TelCo’s Sales Medium,
such as the reallocation of customers to new sales
channels. The data scientists were also placed in
charge of the task of identifying sales opportunities
(with the CLM model) that would then be processed
by agents in external sales organizations:
But we also sort of do part of the work that the account
manager used to do, because now we have to brain-
storm which customers should be approached for
which portfolio, which customers should be selected
for the call centers. . . . (Data scientist)
One account manager reflected on the radical changes
in Sales Medium:
The account managers are highly trained or have a lot
of experience, so they’re not like a random street guy
you could just put on the phone and just call, yeah? So,
to me, it seemed like they said, ‘OK, we’re just going to
get random street guys, and they’re going to make
phone calls based upon the CLM model, and because
the CLMmodel has already proved itself, it’s going to
be very successful!’ (Account manager)
In sum, in this period, the data scientists acted
symbolically to gain managerial support and establish
their authority in SalesMedium, enabledby the symbolic
conformity of the accountmanagers. This third period in
which these reinforcing cycles of symbolic actions oc-
curred (see also Table 5) resulted in establishing the
CLMmodel as the legitimateway ofworking, thereby
increasing the pressure on the accountmanagers,who
had to register their use of the CLM model symbol-
ically in order to defend their knowing practices while
appearing compliant. Establishing the CLMmodel as an
effective way of doing sales further supported higher
management in framing a major reorganization, based
on the valuation scheme of efficiency reflected in the
CLM model. Through this reorganization, the account
managers were no longer needed, and the data scientists
established their authority inSalesMediumand radically
changed the knowing practices. Clearly, the regime of
knowing in Sales Medium had become fundamentally
different from how it was before the introduction of the
CLM model.
Discussion
In this field study of the sales function at TelCo, we
documented a radical change in the sales regime of
knowing from one focused on a deep understanding
of customers via personal contacts and strong rela-
tionships to one based on model predictions from the
processing of large population-wide and historical
data sets. The introduction of data analytics was
followed by a struggle over the regime of knowing
between the data scientists and the accountmanagers.
The account managers found the predictive model to
be incommensurate with their knowing practices and
in contradiction with the established valuation schemes
and authority arrangements. They resorted to sym-
bolic conformity, for instance, by designating person-
ally generated sales leads as coming from the analytics
model. In turn, the data scientists resorted to symbolic
advocacy; for example, they presented the increase in
registered sales leads as evidence of the model’s effec-
tiveness. For management, this apparent success of
the predictive model confirmed the superiority of the
new way of working and led to the layoff of most of
the account managers. We find that this dance of sym-
bolic conformity and advocacy did, ironically, accelerate
this radical change in the regime of knowing.
A Regime-of-Knowing Perspective on Technology-
Related Organizational Change
As the bidirectional arrows show in the model in
Figure 2, the three aspects of the regime of knowing
(knowing practices, valuation schemes, and authority
arrangements) are intertwined in such a way that
change in one is coupled with a change in the other
two. Our findings indicate that these dynamics of
change in one aspect influencing change in other
aspects recurred in each of the three periods, each
time spurred on by cycles of symbolic actions, ulti-
mately leading to change in the whole regime of
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knowing. For example, in the TelCo case, before the
introduction of the CLMmodel, the original knowing
practices related to understanding customers through
personal contact were coherent with the valuation
scheme of forming deep relationships and with ac-
count managers having authority over how to ap-
proach their customers. Thus, changes in the valuation
scheme and authority arrangements eventually led to
contemporaneous changes in the knowing practices.
The interconnection between the aspects of a re-
gime of knowing is important and has implications
for change. We found that the incumbent workers
whose work was affected by the technological change
(i.e., the account managers) performed symbolic con-
formity in order to defend their knowing practices and
to avoid real change. However, symbolic conformity
enabled the technologists who introduced the new
technology (i.e., the data scientists) to perform symbolic
advocacy. The technologists performed symbolic ad-
vocacy with the intention to change all aspects of the
regime of knowing. They targeted the valuation scheme
throughout all three time periods; the knowing prac-
tices in particular during the second period; and the
authority arrangements during the last period. Thus,
whereas the incumbent workers only defended their
knowing practices, the technologists addressed all
three aspects of the regime of knowing. Moreover,
symbolic advocacy to target one aspect of the regime,
had ripple effects and resulted in changing the other
two aspects as well (because all three are intertwined).
Thus, by triggering symbolic advocacy, symbolic
conformity aimed to maintain the knowing practices
inadvertently contributed to changing the valuation
scheme and the authority arrangements, and through
those aspects, ultimately also changing the know-
ing practices.
Because actors tend to act within a regime of
knowing unreflectively, they are usually unaware of
how the aspects of the regime are intertwined. In fact,
when actors focus on only one aspect of the regime of
knowing, they may overlook changes taking place in
other aspects, which could lead to unexpected con-
sequences. For example, in our case, the account
managers conformed symbolically to defend their
knowing practices, focusing on resolving the practical
challenges posed to themwith the introduction of the
data analytics technology. They were so engaged in
the established regime that they could not conceive
that the new approach could ever turn out to be a
superior way of working. Thus, they overlooked the
more fundamental and deeper challenges related to
the valuation scheme and the authority arrange-
ments. They enacted symbolic conformity to sustain
their knowing practices, without realizing that, in this
way, they had opened the door for the data scientists’
symbolic advocacy tactics, which focused on all three
aspects of the regime of knowing. By using symbolic
advocacy, the data scientists managed to increase the
value of the CLM model within TelCo and gain
support from management. This eventually granted
them authority, enabling them to push for funda-
mental changes in the knowing practices, and thereby
radically transforming the regime of knowing.
Taking a regime-of-knowing lens illuminates why
and how actors may resort to symbolic actions during
technology introduction. Our findings suggest that
symbolic conformity was a way for the incumbent
workers who were affected by the technological change
(i.e., the account managers) to sustain their knowing
practices because they did not have sufficient power to
resist implementation efforts by the technologists who
introduced the new technology. Technologists may en-
gage in symbolic advocacy in order to gain legitimacy
and support from management and other stakeholders.
In our case, symbolic advocacy involved promoting
the effectiveness gains associated with the model-based
ways of working. These actions were performed behind
the scenes or indirectly to management. When both in-
cumbent workers and technologists resorted to sym-
bolic action, their distinct sets of symbolic actions
reinforced each other and thus ironically became an
important mechanism for accelerating the evolution
of the regime of knowing. This was illustrated in the
recursive relationship between symbolic advocacy
and conformity in Figure 2. Both types of symbolic
actions had a material component: what data were
entered, how they were processed, and how they
were deployed became areas of symbolic struggle.
Thus, symbolic conformity, enacted through the ap-
parently innocuous move by account managers of
“ticking the box” when registering leads in the CRM
system, ultimately had dire consequences. The data
Figure 2. Change of a Regime of Knowing Through
Symbolic Actions
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scientists used the entered data to “objectively”
demonstrate the success of the CLM model to
stakeholders and therefore affected the valuation
scheme and authority arrangements. This resulted in
increased pressure on the account managers to con-
form. These reinforcing cycles of symbolic conformity
and symbolic advocacy affected aspects of the regime
of knowing in unintended ways and with ironic
consequences.
Like in all qualitative studies, certain boundary
conditions influenced the occurrence of these dy-
namics and may limit their generalizability. First,
neither the account managers nor the data scientists
had deciding authority over the Sales Medium function
and thus could not impose their version of the regime of
knowing. The lack of managerial intervention in the
initial stages of the introduction of the CLM technology
was also an important factor that triggered the struggle
over the regime of knowing. If management had been
involved from the start, the actors might have tried to
engage with each other more substantively, rather than
merely acting symbolically, and the regime of know-
ing might have evolved differently. Another boundary
condition is the complexity and scale of the sale. In the
TelCo case, the account managers who served large-
sized enterprises were able to decline the introduction
of the model because their deep engagement with their
customers was economically crucial and too conse-
quential tounsettle. Finally, the process of integrating the
technologists into the sales function may have been
highly consequential for the dynamics that emerged.
If the data scientists had been collocated or pairedwith
members of the sales teams, they may have engaged
more genuinely with the account managers. Instead,
they were allowed to remain separate, and this led to
the polarization of differences.
Theoretical Implications
The regime-of-knowing lens that this study advances
offers a new way to approach and understand the
introduction of new technology in the workplace.
Literature has shown that technology introduction
can be highly problematic when it is associated with
novel and unfamiliar practices that challenge how
actors construct and use knowledge (Barley 1986,
Zuboff 1988, Bailey et al. 2012, Barrett et al. 2012). The
regime-of-knowingperspectiveviewsknowingpractices
as entwined with valuation schemes and authority ar-
rangements. This helps researchers see below the surface
of struggles over changing established practices and
understand the deeper challenges that actors are faced
with, such as disputing what is worth knowing, what
actions matter to acquire this knowledge, and who has
the authority to make decisions around those issues.
The regime-of-knowing perspective is useful to
better understand the power dynamics around the
integration of novel knowing practices with the in-
troduction of technology. Incorporating new ways of
knowing brings new power asymmetries by chal-
lenging who knows, who decides who knows, and
who decides who decides (Zuboff 2019). The relative
authority of actors is often a decisive factor in de-
termining the outcomes of such power struggles
(Markus 1983, Noble 1984, Barley 1990, Anthony
2018). However, the dynamics and outcomes of such
conflicts are difficult to predict if none of the actors in-
volved have full authority over the work domain. In
those cases, the actors draw on aspects of the regime
of knowing to affect the power struggle. For example,
in our case, the technologists (i.e., thedata scientists) tried
to act on the valuation scheme in order to trigger man-
agement to take a stance, eventually having an impact
on the authority arrangements and enforcing changes in
the knowing practices.
When studying organizational or work changes
that come about with the introduction of a new tech-
nology, the regime-of-knowing perspective can be an
alternative to technological deterministic explanations.
This perspective acknowledges that technology intro-
duction can be associated with new ways of engaging
with the world and novel approaches to the produc-
tion of knowledge (Galison 1997, Knorr-Cetina 1999,
Zuboff 2019). Yet, changes in knowing practices are
not just tied to a new technology as if that were an
external deterministic force, nor do they result from a
planned implementation program. Instead, they are
shaped by how the actors engage in the emerging
struggles (Noble 1984, Kraemer et al. 1987, Zuboff
1988, Bailey and Leonardi 2015). Using a regime-of-
knowing lens deepens our understanding of how such
struggles unfold.Our study reveals that contests over the
transformation of existing knowing practices can unfold
behind the scenes through a series of symbolic actions.
Advancing a regime-of-knowing lens has also helped
us understand why changes in knowing practices may
emerge as unintended outcomes of those symbolic ac-
tions. Actors may resort to symbolic conformity to deal
with the inconsistencies between a newly introduced
technology and work practices (Azad and King 2008,
Berente and Yoo 2012, Berente et al. 2016, Christin
2017). Or actors may engage in symbolic advocacy
to gain legitimacy and support over the suggested
changes from internal and external stakeholders
(Brown 1994, 1995). Such symbolic actions are highly
consequential, especially because of their reinforcing
dynamics. As actors tend to operate within a regime
of knowing almost unreflectively, they may act sym-
bolically by focusing on one aspect of the regime,
without realizing that this could enable or reinforce
symbolic actions oriented to the other two aspects. Thus,
whereas symbolic actions are generally viewed as a
safety valve to maintain actors’ idiosyncratic ways of
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working (Oliver 1991, Hallett 2010), our study offers
a different view according to which symbolic actions
may work against the actors’ intentions and yield
dramatic consequences that extend beyond their control.
For example, symbolic conformity may result in various
ironic outcomes, such as damaging the very same actors
who conform symbolically, or even luring management
to perform radical changes without any real evidence
that the new knowing practices are more effective than
the old ones.
This study also contributes to the emergent liter-
ature on regimes of knowing by showing how trans-
formation of a regime of knowing takes place. Regimes
of knowledge have been demonstrated to be a useful
framework to make sense of clashes over pragmatic
differences (Howard-Grenville and Carlile 2006). When
encountering radical work changes, actors draw on
well-established conventions regarding what are good
ways of acting to establish the legitimacy of their claims
(Thévenot 2001, Patriotta et al. 2011, Cloutier and
Langley 2013). Shifting the attention to knowing and
to a processual, dynamic view of regimes has proven
useful to explain how radical change inways ofworking
takes place and how the interactions of the actors in-
volved affect this change process.
Finally, the emergence of new algorithmic tech-
nologies, such as data analytics, deep learning, and
robotics that are increasingly permeating almost every
process in nearly every type of organizational set-
ting, is making the regime-of-knowing lens more nec-
essary than ever. Such technologies generate insight,
classifications, or predictions that resemble those of a
knowledge worker (Faraj et al. 2018). They are asso-
ciated with paradigms that challenge what counts as
valuable information and how it is produced (Boyd
and Crawford 2012). They impose deep changes on
existing organizational members’ ways of working
that may be difficult to embrace (Anthony 2018).
Thus, technologies can pose an existential threat to the
knowledge workforce and implicate radical changes
in forms of organizing (Zuboff 2019). The regime-of-
knowing lens helps shed light on the deeper chal-
lenges arising from the emergence of algorithmic
technologies, related not only with howwe know, but
also with which ways of knowing are more valu-
able and who determines that. Thus, the regime-of-
knowing perspective can be a useful tool in the quest
for answering research questions related to how such
emerging technologies influence attitudes and be-
haviors in the workplace, how they affect power
structures, and how they become associated with al-
tered work content and processes.
Conclusions
Triggered by observations of ironic consequences of
symbolic conformity during the introduction of new
technology,we used a regime-of-knowing lens to explain
howstruggles unfoldwhen actors are facedwith changes
in the established ways of working. We found that
knowing practices are highly intertwined with deeper
assumptions about which way of knowing is superior
or who has authority to make decisions about how
knowledge should be obtained. Thus, a regime-of-
knowing lens facilitates the study of the actions that
take place below the surface of a struggle over incom-
mensurate ways of knowing and helps explain how
radical transformationofknowingpracticesmayhappen
through the reinforcing dynamics of symbolic actions.
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